How Las Vegas is Betting on Klint Kubiak and Tom Brady to Fix a Broken Franchise
On February 10, 2026, the Las Vegas Raiders introduced Klint Kubiak as their fourth head coach in six years, just 48 hours after he won Super Bowl LX as the Seattle Seahawks’ offensive coordinator. The timing was extraordinary. Most coaches need weeks to decompress after a championship before starting new jobs. Kubiak flew directly from Levi’s Stadium to Las Vegas, skipping the Seahawks’ victory parade to begin rebuilding the NFL’s worst franchise.
The Raiders finished 3-14 in 2025, their worst record in two decades. They had fired head coach Pete Carroll despite bringing him in with great fanfare just 12 months earlier. They had missed the playoffs eight straight seasons. Their star defensive end, Maxx Crosby, was reportedly requesting a trade. Their quarterback situation was unresolved. Their roster needed an overhaul that would require multiple drafts to complete.
Into this dysfunction walked Kubiak, 39 years old with zero previous head coaching experience, carrying the credibility of a Super Bowl ring but facing questions about whether offensive coordinator success translated to head coaching competence. More intriguingly, he would be reporting to minority owner Tom Brady, the seven-time Super Bowl champion who had purchased a 5 percent stake in the Raiders in October 2024 but whose exact role in football operations remained deliberately vague.
Owner Mark Davis made clear at Kubiak’s introductory press conference that Brady and general manager John Spytek were “running the football side of this building.” The structure was unusual. In most NFL organizations, minority owners attended board meetings and wrote checks but stayed out of personnel decisions. Brady was essentially functioning as an executive vice president of football operations without the title, advising on coaching hires, draft strategy, and roster construction while simultaneously working as Fox Sports’ lead NFL analyst and maintaining business interests across multiple industries.
The arrangement raised fundamental questions about organizational structure, accountability, and whether Brady’s football genius as a player transferred to management. Could Kubiak succeed while reporting to two bosses with potentially conflicting agendas? Would Brady’s involvement stabilize a dysfunctional organization or create additional layers of complexity? And could any coach fix the Raiders given their history of organizational chaos dating back decades?
The Tom Brady Variable
When the Raiders announced Brady’s minority ownership stake in October 2024, NFL observers assumed it was largely ceremonial. Professional sports leagues were filled with celebrity minority owners who lent their names and occasionally attended games but had minimal operational involvement. Brady seemed likely to follow this pattern given his broadcasting commitments and tendency to protect his personal brand.
That assumption proved wrong almost immediately. Multiple reports indicated Brady had played a central role in hiring John Spytek as general manager in January 2025. Brady participated extensively in coaching interviews before the Raiders hired Pete Carroll. He attended team practices and maintained regular contact with coaches and executives throughout the 2025 season despite NFL restrictions on his access due to broadcasting commitments.
Mark Davis explicitly wanted Brady functioning as a football czar who could provide strategic oversight across all aspects of football operations. Davis believed the Raiders needed a football mind at ownership level who understood modern NFL strategy but was not buried in day-to-day coaching or scouting responsibilities. He modeled the role after what John Elway had done early in his tenure with the Denver Broncos, though Elway had held an actual executive title while Brady operated more informally.
The structure created ambiguity about authority and accountability. Was Spytek the final decision-maker on personnel, or did Brady have veto power? Could Kubiak design his own offensive system, or would Brady’s preferences influence schematic choices? If the Raiders failed again, who would be held accountable: Spytek, Kubiak, or Brady?
Brady’s defenders argued his involvement brought invaluable expertise. He understood quarterback evaluation better than any executive in football. His work ethic and attention to detail were legendary. His Super Bowl resume commanded respect from players and coaches. His presence made the Raiders a more attractive destination for coaching and free agent talent.
Critics pointed to his lack of management experience. Playing quarterback brilliantly did not necessarily translate to evaluating talent or designing organizational systems. Brady had never scouted college players, negotiated contracts, managed a coaching staff, or balanced roster construction across 53 positions and a salary cap. His playing career gave him insights but not management skills that required different expertise.
The 2025 season provided ammunition for critics. The Raiders went 3-14 with Brady heavily involved in football decisions. Quarterback Geno Smith, whom Brady had endorsed, threw 17 interceptions against 19 touchdowns while the offense ranked 28th in the NFL. Pete Carroll, the respected veteran coach Brady supported hiring, was fired after one season. The dysfunction and failure that characterized the Raiders for two decades continued despite Brady’s presence.
Klint Kubiak: Pedigree and Pressure
Kubiak arrived in Las Vegas with the Kubiak surname, which carried enormous credibility in NFL coaching circles. His father, Gary Kubiak, had been John Elway’s backup quarterback for nine seasons before transitioning to a 25-year coaching career that included a Super Bowl victory with the Denver Broncos in 2015. Klint grew up around NFL locker rooms and coaching meetings, absorbing football knowledge from childhood.
The younger Kubiak’s coaching ascent was rapid. After brief stints in college football and various NFL assistant roles, he joined the San Francisco 49ers as defensive quality control coach in 2021. He moved to assistant quarterbacks coach in 2022 before being promoted to offensive passing game specialist in 2024. When the Seahawks hired Mike Macdonald as head coach in 2025, they brought Kubiak to Seattle as offensive coordinator.
His one season coordinating Seattle’s offense was spectacular. The Seahawks averaged 29.1 points per game, sixth in the NFL. Quarterback Sam Darnold, whom many considered a bust after disappointing stints with the Jets and Panthers, played at an MVP level with 32 touchdown passes and just 11 interceptions. The offense featured creative play designs, effective use of pre-snap motion, and aggressive downfield passing that maximized receiver talent.
The Super Bowl victory in February 2026 cemented Kubiak’s reputation. Seattle’s offense scored 29 points against the New England Patriots’ top-ranked defense, controlling the game through balanced play calling that kept Patriots defensive coordinator guessing. Kubiak called plays that created favorable matchups through formation adjustments and motion, showcasing the strategic sophistication that convinced the Raiders he could translate coordinator success to head coaching.
However, Kubiak’s resume raised questions. One season as offensive coordinator was an extremely limited track record. He had never managed a defense, special teams, or the personnel complexities that consumed head coaches. He had not faced the leadership challenges of managing a 53-man roster, navigating veteran egos, or handling the political dynamics with front offices and ownership that destroyed many coordinator-to-head-coach transitions.
Most concerning was inexperience with organizational dysfunction. The 49ers and Seahawks were well-run franchises with stable leadership, talented rosters, and winning cultures. Kubiak had never navigated the chaos that defined the Raiders, where coaching changes occurred annually, personnel decisions followed no discernible strategy, and dysfunction was organizational default rather than exception.
The No. 1 Pick and Franchise Quarterback Decision
The Raiders owned the first overall pick in the 2026 NFL Draft, a consequence of their 3-14 record and the first time in franchise history they would pick first. Consensus held that they would select Indiana quarterback Fernando Mendoza, the 2025 Heisman Trophy winner who projected as the draft’s top quarterback prospect.
Mendoza fit the modern NFL quarterback prototype. He stood 6-foot-3 and weighed 220 pounds with above-average athleticism and mobility. His college tape showed excellent processing speed, quick release, and accuracy to all levels of the field. He had started 26 games at Indiana, posting a 20-6 record while throwing 61 touchdown passes against just 14 interceptions. Multiple NFL evaluators compared him favorably to Josh Allen and Patrick Mahomes as prospects.
More significantly, Mendoza publicly idolized Tom Brady and modeled his preparation and approach on Brady’s TB12 methodology. In interviews, Mendoza cited reading Brady’s book and studying his film obsessively. The connection between Mendoza and Brady created a natural narrative: the legendary quarterback mentoring his young admirer, teaching him NFL-level preparation while Kubiak handled on-field coaching.
However, selecting Mendoza at No. 1 overall was not guaranteed. Some evaluators questioned his arm strength and whether he could make all NFL throws. Others worried about competition level: Indiana played in the Big Ten but had not faced SEC-caliber defenses that better simulated NFL speed and complexity. The Raiders could also consider trading the pick to a quarterback-needy team and acquiring multiple first-round selections that would accelerate roster rebuilding.
The decision fell primarily to Spytek, but Brady’s input would clearly influence the choice. Did Brady see enough of himself in Mendoza to endorse the selection? Would Brady push for alternative strategies like trading down or selecting a different position? The ambiguity about Brady’s exact role made decision-making accountability unclear.
Beyond the draft, Kubiak faced personnel decisions about Maxx Crosby, the star defensive end requesting a trade. Crosby was entering his prime at age 28 and was widely considered a top-five defensive end in the NFL. Losing him would devastate the defense. But Crosby had grown frustrated with losing and reportedly wanted to compete for championships rather than endure another rebuilding cycle.
Kubiak and Davis both stated publicly that they wanted Crosby to remain a Raider. But if Crosby insisted on leaving, the Raiders could potentially acquire two first-round picks by trading him, accelerating the roster overhaul. The decision carried enormous implications for Kubiak’s first season: keep Crosby and retain defensive foundation but limit draft capital, or trade him and accept short-term defensive collapse while stockpiling picks for the future.
The Challenge of NFL Head Coaching
Modern NFL head coaching had evolved into an impossibly complex role. Head coaches managed 53-man rosters requiring detailed knowledge of 10 to 15 position groups. They oversaw offensive, defensive, and special teams coordinators who functioned as CEOs of their own operational units. They navigated salary cap constraints that forced difficult personnel decisions. They managed veteran egos, developed young players, and maintained team culture amid constant roster turnover.
The job also required political skills. Head coaches reported to general managers and ownership while working within organizational structures that varied wildly across franchises. They faced intense media scrutiny and fan pressure. They made dozens of micro-decisions per game that determined outcomes: clock management, fourth-down decisions, challenge flags, timeout usage, personnel groupings, play calling authority.
Most coordinator-to-head-coach transitions failed. Offensive coordinators who excelled at designing plays and calling games often struggled with defensive management, special teams oversight, and leadership dynamics that extended beyond their expertise. The skill sets were fundamentally different. Great coordinators focused narrowly on their operational unit. Head coaches needed broader strategic vision and organizational leadership that many coordinators never developed.
Kubiak faced additional challenges unique to the Raiders. The organization had hired four coaches since 2021: Jon Gruden, Josh McDaniels, Antonio Pierce, and Pete Carroll, with an interim coach between Gruden and McDaniels. Each brought different philosophies and systems, creating roster fragmentation as players were acquired for schemes that became obsolete with the next coaching change.
The franchise also carried historical baggage dating to Al Davis, the legendary owner who built Raiders greatness in the 1970s and 1980s but whose later decisions drove decades of mediocrity. His son Mark inherited an organization that combined pride in past glory with dysfunction in current operations. Mark Davis had proven he could not hire coaches successfully, having tried experienced NFL coaches (Carroll, Gruden), hot young coordinators (McDaniels), and internal promotions (Pierce). All had failed.
Collaborative Leadership or Too Many Cooks?
Mark Davis described the Raiders’ new structure as collaborative: Kubiak as head coach, Spytek as general manager, and Brady as strategic advisor. The three would work together on personnel decisions, draft strategy, and organizational direction. Davis believed this structure would prevent the silos that plagued many franchises where coaches and general managers competed rather than collaborated.
However, collaboration required clear authority lines and compatible personalities. The Raiders’ structure left authority ambiguous. If Kubiak wanted to draft a specific player but Spytek disagreed, who decided? If Brady advocated for an offensive philosophy Kubiak found uncomfortable, who prevailed? The lack of clear hierarchy could paralyze decision-making or create power struggles that undermined all three executives.
Successful collaborative structures in the NFL were rare. The Kansas City Chiefs’ partnership between coach Andy Reid and general manager Brett Veach worked because Reid established himself as head coach before Veach became GM, creating clear hierarchy within collaborative framework. The San Francisco 49ers’ structure with coach Kyle Shanahan and GM John Lynch succeeded because both started simultaneously and Lynch deferred to Shanahan on football decisions.
The Raiders’ situation differed. Kubiak was untested. Spytek had been general manager for only one year with poor results. Brady had enormous credibility but unclear authority and conflicting commitments. None had established leadership or working relationships. They would be building collaboration during a high-pressure rebuild with intense scrutiny and limited time to develop trust.
Kubiak’s personality would be critical. His introductory press conference was notable for its humility and collaborative tone. He repeatedly emphasized learning from Brady and Spytek, working within established systems rather than demanding autocratic control. This approach contrasted sharply with many young coaches who demanded personnel authority and bristled at front office involvement.
However, humility could become weakness if Kubiak lacked conviction when disagreements arose. Effective head coaches needed confidence to advocate forcefully for their vision even when others disagreed. Kubiak’s inexperience and Brady’s legendary status could create dynamic where Brady’s preferences dominated, leaving Kubiak as implementer rather than strategic leader.
The Offensive Philosophy Question
Kubiak’s success in Seattle stemmed from a modern NFL offensive philosophy emphasizing pre-snap motion, play action, and creating favorable matchups through formation adjustments. His offense attacked aggressively downfield, trusting quarterbacks to make throws into tight windows and receivers to win contested catches. The scheme worked brilliantly with Sam Darnold’s strong arm and Seattle’s talented receiver corps.
Whether that philosophy would translate to Las Vegas was uncertain. The Raiders lacked Seattle’s offensive talent. Their receivers were pedestrian. Their offensive line ranked among the NFL’s worst. If they drafted Mendoza, they would have a rookie quarterback learning NFL speed. The components that made Kubiak’s Seattle offense work simply did not exist in Las Vegas.
Kubiak would need to adapt his scheme to available personnel, which required the flexibility many young coordinators struggled to demonstrate. He could not simply transport Seattle’s offense to Las Vegas and expect similar results. He needed to design an offense that maximized limited talent while developing the quarterback and rebuilding the roster around a coherent schematic vision.
Brady’s presence created another variable. Brady had played in the Erhardt-Perkins offensive system throughout his career, a philosophy emphasizing precision timing, quarterback reads, and quick decision-making. Kubiak came from the Shanahan/McVay offensive tree, which prioritized play action, outside zone running, and motion to create favorable looks. These philosophies were not incompatible, but they emphasized different principles.
Would Brady push Kubiak toward Erhardt-Perkins concepts given Brady’s belief in their effectiveness? Would Kubiak feel pressure to incorporate Brady’s preferences even if they conflicted with his own philosophy? Or would Brady respect Kubiak’s expertise and let him implement his own system without interference? The relationship dynamics would significantly impact offensive design and ultimately team performance.
The Market Dynamics and Time Pressure
Las Vegas presented unique challenges as an NFL market. The city had only hosted the Raiders since 2020 after their relocation from Oakland. The fan base was small by NFL standards, still developing local roots rather than the multi-generational support that defined traditional franchises. Home games at Allegiant Stadium drew heavily from opposing fans and tourists rather than loyal Raiders supporters.
This created unusual pressure. In markets like Green Bay or Pittsburgh, fans tolerated multi-year rebuilds because of deep emotional connections to the franchise. In Las Vegas, fans had limited history with the team and abundant entertainment alternatives competing for discretionary spending. If the Raiders continued losing, the local fan base could simply stop caring and spend money on other Vegas attractions.
The tourism economy also affected attendance and revenue. Business travelers and tourists bought tickets for entertainment value rather than team loyalty, which meant continued losing would directly impact ticket sales more than in traditional markets. The Raiders could not rely on season ticket holders maintaining support through down years because such loyalty had not yet developed.
Mark Davis felt this pressure acutely. He had invested everything in the Las Vegas move, building the stadium and relocating the franchise. He needed on-field success to justify the investment and build sustainable fan support. His impatience, reflected in hiring four coaches in six years, was understandable given market dynamics but also counterproductive since rebuilding required time that impatience prevented.
Kubiak inherited this pressure despite being told he would get time to rebuild. The history suggested otherwise. If the Raiders started 2-8 in Kubiak’s first season, would Davis and Brady maintain patience? The franchise’s track record indicated no. Kubiak would need to show tangible progress immediately, which was difficult with the roster talent and franchise dysfunction he inherited.
The Path Forward and Strategic Questions
Kubiak’s introductory press conference emphasized several priorities: evaluating the roster thoroughly, installing his offensive system, developing the quarterback position, and building a winning culture. These were standard head coach platitudes, but each presented enormous challenges given Raiders circumstances.
Roster evaluation was complicated by the multiple coaching changes. Players acquired for Jon Gruden’s offense did not fit Josh McDaniels’ scheme. Players brought in for Pete Carroll’s defense were wrong for whatever system Kubiak’s defensive coordinator would install. Kubiak would need to decide quickly which players fit his vision and which should be replaced, but making those determinations was difficult without seeing players in his own system.
Installing offensive and defensive systems was complicated by the coaching staff he needed to hire. Kubiak had not announced coordinators or position coaches. Would he promote from within the existing staff or hire entirely new coaches? Each choice carried trade-offs. Promoting internal candidates provided continuity but might perpetuate underperformance. Hiring externally brought fresh perspectives but required time for new coaches to learn personnel and for players to learn new schemes.
Developing the quarterback position was paramount whether the Raiders drafted Mendoza or pursued another solution. Kubiak’s success in Seattle with Darnold demonstrated quarterback development skills, but Darnold was a veteran with years of NFL experience. Developing a rookie quarterback required different teaching approaches and patience for inevitable growing pains.
Building winning culture was perhaps the most difficult challenge. The Raiders had lost more games than they won in every season since 2016. Players did not know what winning culture looked like because they had not experienced it. Kubiak would need to establish standards, hold players accountable, and gradually shift organizational psychology from accepting mediocrity to demanding excellence. This transformation typically required multiple seasons.
The timeline pressure created by Raiders history and Las Vegas market dynamics meant Kubiak probably did not have multiple seasons. He needed to show progress immediately. But building sustainable winning culture required time that organizational impatience might not allow. This fundamental tension would define his tenure.
Lessons for NFL Leadership and Ownership
The Raiders’ situation offered lessons about NFL organizational structure and leadership. The traditional model placed general managers as final authority on personnel decisions with head coaches providing input. This structure worked well when general managers had strong football backgrounds and coaches respected their expertise. It failed when general managers and coaches competed rather than collaborated.
The modern trend toward collaborative structures recognized that successful franchises needed aligned vision between coaching and personnel. But collaboration required trust, clear communication, and compatible personalities. Simply declaring that executives would collaborate did not make it happen. Organizations needed deliberate efforts to build relationships and establish decision-making processes.
The Raiders’ approach, inserting Brady as strategic advisor, was experimental. In theory, having a football genius with ownership access could align coaching, personnel, and ownership vision. In practice, it created accountability ambiguity and potential power struggles. If the structure succeeded, other franchises might copy it. If it failed, it would validate traditional organizational hierarchies.
The situation also highlighted challenges of celebrity ownership. Brady brought credibility and expertise, but also distractions from his broadcasting career and business interests. He could not be full-time involved in Raiders operations while maintaining other commitments. The part-time involvement might be sufficient for strategic guidance but inadequate for the detailed knowledge that informed best decisions.
For aspiring coaches, Kubiak’s situation demonstrated risks and rewards of first-time head coaching positions. The Raiders job offered immediate head coaching opportunity but came with dysfunction, poor roster, and unrealistic expectations. Kubiak could have waited for better situations, but opportunities were rare and timing was unpredictable. Sometimes accepting imperfect situations was necessary to break into the head coaching ranks.
The 2026 Season and Beyond
As Kubiak prepared for his first season, realistic expectations were difficult to establish. The Raiders’ roster ranked among the NFL’s worst. They would draft high and could improve through free agency, but rebuilding required multiple seasons. Expecting playoffs in 2026 was unrealistic. But showing tangible progress, competitive games, and player development was achievable and necessary.
The quarterback situation would dominate early season narratives. If the Raiders drafted Mendoza at No. 1, he would face enormous pressure to justify the selection. Rookie quarterbacks typically struggled, but Mendoza would be expected to perform immediately given where he was drafted and the Brady connection. Managing expectations while developing Mendoza would test Kubiak’s communication skills and Brady’s patience.
Crosby’s situation would also define early season perception. If he was traded, the defense would likely collapse and losses would mount. If he stayed and the defense improved while the offense developed, the team could show progress even with a losing record. But if Crosby stayed and continued voicing displeasure while the team lost, it would create distracting drama that undermined Kubiak’s authority.
Looking beyond 2026, the Raiders’ trajectory depended on factors outside Kubiak’s control. Could Spytek draft effectively and build roster depth? Would Brady’s involvement be genuinely helpful or create bureaucratic complexity? Could the organization maintain patience through inevitable struggles? Would the Las Vegas market support a rebuilding team?
Kubiak’s task was impossible by most measures. He was asked to fix decades of organizational dysfunction with a terrible roster, unclear authority structure, and minimal time to show results. He had zero head coaching experience and would be working with a celebrity minority owner whose exact role remained ambiguous. Most external observers expected failure.
But Kubiak also had advantages. His Super Bowl victory brought credibility and confidence. His relationship with Brady created potential for invaluable mentorship if managed well. The No. 1 pick gave him a potential franchise quarterback to build around. And his youth and energy offered fresh perspective on an organization desperate for new ideas.
Whether these advantages would overcome the enormous structural and personnel challenges was the defining question of the Raiders’ 2026 season and Kubiak’s NFL coaching career. The answer would determine whether collaborative leadership structures with celebrity ownership could succeed in the modern NFL, or whether traditional hierarchies existed for good reason.
Key Takeaways
The Raiders hired Klint Kubiak as head coach just 48 hours after he won Super Bowl LX as Seattle’s offensive coordinator. At 39 with zero previous head coaching experience, Kubiak faces rebuilding the NFL’s worst franchise (3-14 in 2025) while reporting to minority owner Tom Brady and general manager John Spytek in an ambiguous organizational structure.
Mark Davis explicitly stated that Brady and Spytek are “running the football side of this building,” creating collaborative leadership structure where authority lines remain unclear. Brady functions as a de facto executive vice president without the title, while simultaneously working as Fox Sports analyst and maintaining other business interests.
The Raiders hold the No. 1 overall pick in the 2026 NFL Draft and are expected to select Indiana quarterback Fernando Mendoza, who publicly idolizes Brady. The Brady-Mendoza connection creates natural mentorship opportunity but also raises questions about whether Brady’s presence helps or complicates coaching and player development.
Star defensive end Maxx Crosby reportedly wants a trade after years of losing. The Raiders must decide whether to keep Crosby and maintain defensive foundation or trade him for draft picks that accelerate rebuild. The decision carries enormous implications for Kubiak’s first season and demonstrates the difficult personnel trade-offs facing the franchise.
The experimental organizational structure with part-time celebrity ownership involvement, collaborative decision-making, and first-time head coach creates accountability ambiguity and potential power struggles. Success could create a model for other franchises, but failure would validate traditional NFL hierarchies with clear general manager authority.
Discussion Questions
- How should the Raiders structure decision-making authority among Kubiak, Spytek, and Brady to enable effective collaboration while maintaining clear accountability? What decision-making frameworks would you implement to prevent power struggles and decision paralysis?
- Should the Raiders trade Maxx Crosby to acquire draft picks and accelerate rebuild, or keep him as defensive foundation and face limitation of fewer draft assets? How would you weigh short-term defensive strength against long-term roster construction?
- Is Tom Brady’s involvement likely to stabilize the Raiders’ dysfunction or add complexity that undermines organizational effectiveness? What would you track to assess whether Brady’s role is helping or hindering the rebuild?
- How should Kubiak balance installing his own offensive philosophy against potential pressure to incorporate Brady’s preferred schemes and concepts? What would you do if Brady advocated for approaches that conflicted with your coaching philosophy?
- If you were an NFL coaching candidate, would you accept the Raiders job given the organizational dysfunction, ambiguous reporting structure, poor roster, and franchise history of impatience? What factors would make the opportunity worth the risks?
