The Pete Carroll era in Las Vegas lasted exactly one season. Seventy-four years old, fresh off a year away from football, and armed with a resume that includes a Super Bowl championship and 14 successful years in Seattle, Carroll was supposed to bring instant credibility to a Raiders franchise desperate for stability. Instead, the 2025 season delivered a 3-14 record, the franchise’s worst showing since 2006, and a swift exit that raises uncomfortable questions about organizational decision-making in professional football.
The Raiders fired Carroll on Monday, just one day after a season-ending victory against Kansas City that felt more like a consolation prize than a turning point. General Manager John Spytek, who was hired alongside Carroll last January, will remain in place and lead the coaching search with minority owner Tom Brady. This marks the sixth head coaching change for the Raiders since 2021. The last coach to survive more than two seasons was Jon Gruden, whose tenure ended in scandal in 2021.
What makes this story particularly striking is not just the failure itself, but the speed and totality of the collapse. Carroll had never been fired after a single season since 1994, when the New York Jets let him go following a 6-10 campaign. That was 31 years ago, when Carroll was still establishing himself as a coach. This time around, he arrived with Hall of Fame credentials and a track record of building winning cultures. None of it mattered.
The Blueprint That Never Materialized
The Raiders’ plan seemed straightforward enough on paper. They brought in offensive coordinator Chip Kelly, a former NFL head coach with a reputation for innovative offensive schemes. They traded for quarterback Geno Smith, who had revitalized his career in Seattle under Carroll’s guidance. They selected running back Ashton Jeanty with the sixth overall pick in the 2025 draft, adding what many considered a generational talent at the position.
The pieces were supposed to fit together like a puzzle designed for quick success. Carroll would establish the culture, Kelly would modernize the offense, Smith would provide veteran leadership, and Jeanty would give them a foundational running game. Instead, the bottom fell out almost immediately.
After winning their season opener against New England, the Raiders lost to Jim Harbaugh’s Los Angeles Chargers in Week 2 and never recovered. The defeat to Carroll’s longtime rival seemed to break something fundamental in the team. They went on to lose nine more consecutive games, posting double-digit defeats in nine contests and scoring fewer than 10 points five times. Against AFC West opponents, they managed just one victory in six attempts.
The offensive numbers tell a grim story. Las Vegas ranked last in every major offensive category, averaging a paltry 77.5 rushing yards per game despite spending a top-10 pick on Jeanty. Smith, the quarterback Carroll specifically requested, threw a league-high 17 interceptions while managing only 19 touchdowns in 15 games. At 35 years old and under contract through 2028, Smith now represents both a financial burden and a symbol of misplaced faith.
The defense fared no better. Despite Carroll’s reputation as a defensive innovator, the Raiders ranked 25th in points allowed at 25.4 per game. The philosophical marriage between Carroll and defensive coordinator Patrick Graham never produced consistent results. Late in the season, as losses mounted and hope evaporated, Carroll made the unprecedented move of firing both Kelly and special teams coordinator Tom McMahon within a 16-day span. In his 27 years as a head coach split between college and the NFL, Carroll had never fired a coordinator midseason. Desperation had set in.
The Cost of Championship Expectations
What went wrong? The simple answer is everything. But the more nuanced truth involves a mismatch between expectations and reality that plagued the organization from day one.
Carroll came to Las Vegas talking about winning games immediately. “We’re going to win a lot of games,” he declared when hired. That confidence reflected both his personality and his track record. In Seattle, he had built a dynasty through strong defense, efficient offense, and cultural alignment. He knew the formula worked because he had executed it successfully for more than a decade.
But Las Vegas in 2025 was not Seattle in 2010. The Seahawks team Carroll inherited had young talent and structural flexibility. The Raiders had aging veterans, expensive contracts, and a roster construction that reflected years of inconsistent decision-making. Carroll’s attempt to fast-track the rebuilding process by acquiring Smith and hiring Kelly suggests he either misread the situation or felt pressure to deliver immediate results. Either explanation is troubling for a coach of his experience.
The Geno Smith trade deserves particular scrutiny. Smith had played well in Seattle, but he was 34 years old when the Raiders acquired him, hardly the age when quarterbacks typically sustain or improve their performance. Carroll’s familiarity with Smith may have clouded his judgment about whether the quarterback could replicate his Seattle success in a different environment with an inferior supporting cast. The 17 interceptions suggest the answer is no.
Meanwhile, Jeanty’s rookie season got lost in the chaos. When your team scores fewer than 10 points five times in a season, even the most talented running back cannot make a meaningful impact. The offensive line struggled, the passing game provided no balance, and opponents simply loaded the box against the run. Jeanty averaged just 3.8 yards per carry, well below the production that made him a top-10 selection.
The Leadership Void
Spytek’s statement about the next coaching search offers revealing glimpses into what went wrong with Carroll. “We’re looking for someone to build this the right way and not think we’ve got to produce 10 wins or whatever next year,” Spytek said. That comment, intentionally or not, serves as an indirect critique of Carroll’s approach. The implication is clear: Carroll pushed for immediate success when the organization needed patient development.
Spytek also emphasized that the next coach must align with “the organization’s long-term vision and goals.” Again, the subtext suggests Carroll’s vision diverged from what ownership wanted. In a healthy organization, those conversations happen during the interview process, not after a 3-14 season.
The Raiders now find themselves in a familiar and uncomfortable position. They have the No. 1 overall pick in the 2026 draft for the third time in franchise history and the first time since selecting JaMarcus Russell in 2007. That pick gives them the option to draft a franchise quarterback, something they have not done in the first round since Russell’s spectacular failure.
But a high draft pick alone does not solve organizational dysfunction. Since moving to Las Vegas in 2020, the Raiders have employed six different head coaches. That level of turnover creates institutional chaos. Players stop buying into systems because they know the system will change in a year or two. Front office personnel operate with shortened time horizons because their jobs depend on immediate results. Long-term planning becomes nearly impossible.
Notes and Takeaways
The Carroll firing reveals several fundamental truths about modern NFL organizations. First, past success does not guarantee future performance, especially when coaches try to replicate old formulas in new contexts. Carroll’s Seattle blueprint worked in Seattle because he had the right personnel, organizational support, and cultural fit. Las Vegas provided none of those elements.
Second, the hire-and-fire cycle creates its own problems. Raiders fans have now watched their team cycle through Jon Gruden, Rich Bisaccia, Josh McDaniels, Antonio Pierce, and Pete Carroll in just five years. Each coach brought a different philosophy, installed different systems, and promised different results. The constant change prevents any coherent identity from forming. Players cannot develop consistency when the coaching staff turns over annually.
Third, the Geno Smith trade illustrates a broader problem in NFL decision-making. Teams often overvalue their own evaluations of players they know well. Carroll knew Smith from Seattle and believed he could translate that success to Las Vegas. But Smith’s Seattle performance occurred in a specific system with specific talent around him. Removing those variables exposed limitations that had been masked by better circumstances.
Fourth, the Raiders’ willingness to fire Kelly midseason and then fire Carroll after just one year suggests an organization reacting rather than planning. Successful teams make difficult decisions, but they make them strategically. The Raiders appear to be making moves out of panic rather than conviction.
The Carroll era will be remembered as a failed experiment in trying to shortcut the rebuilding process. Rather than accept a multi-year timeline for development, the Raiders bet on a legendary coach’s ability to manufacture immediate success. When that bet failed spectacularly, they compounded the mistake by firing coordinators midseason and then jettisoning the head coach after one year.
Now they start over again. New coach, new system, new promises. The No. 1 pick gives them leverage and options. But without addressing the underlying organizational issues that created this mess, another coach will likely find himself unemployed in 12 to 24 months.
The question facing the Raiders is not just who should be their next coach. It is whether they can build the kind of organizational stability that allows any coach to succeed. Until they answer that question honestly, no resume will be impressive enough to overcome the structural dysfunction that has plagued this franchise for half a decade.
Key Insights:
- Legendary credentials do not translate across contexts without proper organizational alignment
- Quarterback acquisitions based on familiarity often overlook environmental factors that enabled past success
- Rapid coaching turnover prevents institutional learning and player development
- Midseason coordinator firings signal panic rather than strategic adjustment
- Organizations must address systemic dysfunction before expecting individual hires to solve structural problems
