The Las Vegas Raiders clinched the No. 1 overall pick in the 2026 NFL Draft on Sunday, January 5th, when the New York Giants defeated the Dallas Cowboys 34-17. For a franchise that began the season with championship aspirations under legendary coach Pete Carroll, this represents both a spectacular failure and an unexpected opportunity. The Raiders finished 3-14, tied for the most losses in franchise history, and now possess the league’s most valuable asset for the third time since 1968.
This is not where the Raiders expected to be. When they hired Carroll in January 2025, traded for quarterback Geno Smith, and selected running back Ashton Jeanty sixth overall, the plan centered on immediate competitiveness. Instead, they endured a 10-game losing streak, ranked last in every major offensive category, and watched their 35-year-old quarterback throw more interceptions than any player in football.
But organizational failure has produced individual opportunity. The No. 1 pick gives Las Vegas the chance to draft a franchise quarterback for the first time since they selected JaMarcus Russell in 2007. It provides leverage in trade negotiations if they choose to move down. It offers hope to a fan base that has watched six different head coaches cycle through the organization since 2021. The question is whether the Raiders can convert this valuable asset into long-term success or whether they will squander it the way they did with Russell nearly two decades ago.
The Road to Rock Bottom
The math became clear in Week 17 when the Raiders lost to the Giants, dropping both teams to 2-13. The loser of that game would control the top pick, barring unusual circumstances in the final week. Las Vegas lost, which meant they needed the Giants to win in Week 18 to clinch the selection. New York obliged by beating Dallas, handing the Raiders the top spot.
The Raiders did not lose intentionally. They placed tight end Brock Bowers and defensive end Maxx Crosby on injured reserve in Week 17, moves the team insisted were medically necessary rather than strategic. Crosby, in particular, made his displeasure known. When informed he would sit out, he left the team facility. “I don’t give a damn about the pick,” Crosby had said earlier in the week. “I don’t play for that.” His frustration reflected a competitive fire that had no outlet in a lost season.
The decision to shut down Crosby and Bowers sparked speculation about competitive balance. Some around the league wondered whether the Raiders prioritized draft position over winning. The team insisted medical professionals made the call, and both players needed rest after battling injuries all season. Crosby faces knee surgery that will sideline him into the offseason. Bowers had been playing with a PCL injury and bone bruise in his left knee since Week 1.
Whether the moves were purely medical or strategically convenient, they accomplished two goals. They protected valuable players from further injury in meaningless games, and they improved the Raiders’ chances of securing the top pick. In a season defined by failure, those decisions at least demonstrated some form of organizational planning, even if it came too late to salvage the year.
The Raiders’ final victory against Kansas City in Week 18 provided a moment of catharsis but changed nothing about their draft position. They finished 3-14, matching the futility of the 2006 season. The win gave kicker Daniel Carlson, a pending free agent, a showcase performance that might earn him a contract. It allowed players to finish the year with some dignity. But it did not alter the fundamental reality that this team underperformed at every level.
The Russell Shadow
History hangs heavy over this moment. The last time the Raiders held the No. 1 pick, they selected quarterback JaMarcus Russell from LSU. That decision became one of the most notorious draft failures in NFL history. Russell lasted three seasons in Oakland, completing just 52.1 percent of his passes, throwing 18 touchdowns against 23 interceptions, and showing up to training camp overweight and unmotivated. The Raiders released him in 2010, and he never played another NFL game.
The Russell failure traumatized the franchise. It cost the Raiders years of development, damaged their reputation, and created skepticism about their ability to evaluate quarterback talent. Nearly two decades later, they still have not recovered. Since Russell, the Raiders have not drafted a quarterback in the first round. They have cycled through veterans like Derek Carr, who they drafted in the second round, and journeymen like Geno Smith. They have never found a long-term solution at the position.
Now they face a similar choice. The 2026 draft class features two prominent quarterback prospects: Indiana’s Fernando Mendoza and Oregon’s Dante Moore. Mendoza just led Indiana to a victory over Oregon in the Peach Bowl, enhancing his draft stock. Moore possesses elite physical tools but played on a less successful team. Both players will be scrutinized, analyzed, and debated from now until April.
The Raiders must decide whether either quarterback justifies the No. 1 selection. They must evaluate whether Geno Smith, who is under contract through 2028, deserves another chance or whether his 17-interception season proved he cannot be the answer. They must weigh the risk of drafting another quarterback against the greater risk of not having a franchise signal-caller for another generation.
General Manager John Spytek, who survived the coaching purge that claimed Carroll, acknowledged the quarterback question directly. “The Raiders haven’t drafted a quarterback in the first round since JaMarcus Russell in 2007,” Spytek said. “That could very well change in April.” His statement reflects both the opportunity and the pressure. Get this pick right, and the Raiders can build around a young quarterback for the next decade. Get it wrong, and Spytek will likely be looking for work.
The Economics of the Top Pick
The No. 1 overall selection carries immense value beyond just the player drafted. It serves as a trade chip that other teams covet, particularly those desperate for a quarterback. If the Raiders decide not to draft a quarterback themselves, they could auction the pick to the highest bidder and accumulate multiple first-round selections, additional high picks, and possibly veteran players.
Recent history shows the profitability of trading down from the top spot. In 2023, the Carolina Panthers traded up to No. 1 to select quarterback Bryce Young, sending the Chicago Bears multiple first-round picks in the process. The Bears used those picks to build a roster that competed for a playoff spot two years later. Similar trades have reshaped franchises, allowing teams to accelerate rebuilds through volume of premium selections.
The Raiders could follow that model. With holes at quarterback, offensive line, defensive line, and in the secondary, they need talent throughout the roster, not just at one position. Trading down could net them two or three first-round picks, allowing them to address multiple needs simultaneously. It would also reduce the pressure of selecting the right player at No. 1, distributing risk across several high-value choices.
But that strategy assumes the Raiders trust their evaluation process and their ability to identify talent. Given their recent track record, that assumption may be optimistic. The same organization that thought Geno Smith could be a franchise quarterback at age 34 now must identify multiple impact players in a single draft. The same front office that built a roster capable of winning only three games must suddenly demonstrate competence in talent evaluation.
The alternative is simpler but riskier: draft a quarterback at No. 1 and hope he becomes a star. This approach requires conviction about the evaluation, confidence in the player’s ability to succeed despite poor surrounding talent, and patience to allow development. The Raiders have not demonstrated any of those qualities recently.
The Organizational Context
What makes the Raiders’ situation more complex is the organizational instability that created this mess. They will hire their sixth head coach since 2021. The last coach to remain with the franchise for more than two seasons was Jon Gruden, whose tenure ended in scandal. This level of turnover creates problems that no draft pick can solve.
Young players need consistent coaching and system stability to develop. When the coaching staff changes annually, players must learn new terminologies, new schemes, and new expectations every season. The constant churn prevents skill development and erodes confidence. Even talented players struggle to reach their potential in environments defined by chaos.
A rookie quarterback drafted at No. 1 will enter this unstable environment. He will play for a head coach who may be gone in two years. He will run an offensive system that might change next season. He will throw to receivers and hand off to running backs who do not know if they fit the new scheme. This is not a recipe for success.
The Raiders must address these structural issues before the draft pick can matter. They need to hire a coach who can establish a long-term vision and stick to it. They need to build an offensive infrastructure that supports quarterback development. They need to create organizational alignment between ownership, front office, and coaching staff. Without these foundational elements, the No. 1 pick becomes another wasted asset in a long line of wasted opportunities.
Notes and Takeaways
The No. 1 overall pick represents both possibility and pressure. For the Raiders, it offers a chance to draft a franchise quarterback and begin a legitimate rebuild. It provides trade leverage to accumulate assets if they choose a different path. It gives fans something to look forward to after a historically bad season.
But the pick alone does not fix what is broken. The Raiders’ problems run deeper than talent deficiency. They suffer from organizational dysfunction, coaching instability, and poor decision-making at the highest levels. Those issues have persisted through multiple front office regimes and ownership transitions. They will not disappear because of one good draft choice.
The JaMarcus Russell comparison looms over this decision because it illustrates what happens when organizations draft for need rather than fit, when they select based on physical tools rather than mental makeup, and when they fail to provide proper support systems for young players. Russell failed not just because of his personal shortcomings but because the Raiders organization could not develop him properly.
The same risks exist today. If the Raiders draft a quarterback at No. 1, they must commit to building around him, providing coaching stability, and exercising patience through inevitable growing pains. If they trade down, they must demonstrate competence in evaluating and developing multiple players simultaneously. Either path requires organizational capabilities the Raiders have not shown recently.
Running back Ashton Jeanty, selected sixth overall last year, offered a revealing comment about the pick’s significance. “That type of pick can change an organization,” Jeanty said. “So, just praying we make the right pick.” His statement reflects the hope that pervades the building mixed with uncertainty about whether the organization can execute effectively.
The Raiders have the most valuable asset in professional football. What they do with it will define the franchise for the next decade. Get it right, and they can build a contender around a young quarterback or stockpile talent through a shrewd trade. Get it wrong, and they will spend another generation wandering in the wilderness, searching for competence that remains frustratingly out of reach.
The season that produced this opportunity was an unmitigated disaster. But the opportunity itself is real. Whether the Raiders possess the organizational capability to capitalize on it remains the most important unanswered question in Las Vegas.
Key Insights:
- The No. 1 pick carries trade value that could yield multiple first-round selections and accelerate a rebuild
- JaMarcus Russell’s failure still haunts Raiders’ quarterback evaluation nearly two decades later
- Organizational instability and coaching turnover undermine player development regardless of draft position
- Geno Smith’s league-high 17 interceptions at age 35 suggest the quarterback position needs immediate attention
- Success with the top pick requires not just good evaluation but proper infrastructure to support player development
